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Abstract: The purpose of  this paper is to test the relationship of  CSR practices –asymmetric in-
formation and ESG performance–asymmetric information. We conjecture that there might be a 
particular role where the disclosure of  non-financial information is deemed useful in truncating 
the level of  asymmetric information. Using data from two different countries, Indonesia (Asia) 
and Portugal (Europe), we extracted 37 companies; the time period of  the observation was from 
2012 to 2016. To manifest the empirical test, we used CSR report (CSR_Rep), CSR commit-
tee (CSR_com), CSR assurance (CSR_ass) and GRI adoption as the proxies of  CSR practices, 
while the proxies of  ESG performance were represented by environmental (ENVscr), social 
(SOCscr), and governance (GOVscr) pillar scores, as obtained from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
database. The bid-ask spread was used as the surrogate indicator of  asymmetric information. 
The empirical test revealed that only the variables GRI and SOCscr showed a negative and 
significant association with the bid-ask spread; whilst the remaining variables of  CSR practices 
(CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass), and ESG performance (ENVscr and GOVscr) were negatively 
associated with asymmetric information (Spread) but are statistically insignificant. Our results 
suggested that CSR practices and ESG performance are contemporaneous and weakly associat-
ed with asymmetric information, while this association gets stronger when we run the model us-
ing lagged independent variables. We thus infer that the information on CSR reporting practices 
and ESG performance scores need some time lag to be fully absorbed by the market participants 
and to be reflected in the bid-ask price changes. 
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Introduction
The number of  studies into corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) is increasing pro-
foundly (Patten and Zhao, 2014; KPMG, 
2015; E and Y, 2017; KPMG, 2017). This is 
triggered by the increasing awareness of  the 
importance of  sustainability practices. As re-
ported by Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerderler or 
KPMG International Cooperative 2017, in a 
survey of  corporate responsibility reporting, 
the number of  CSR reports had doubled. 
KPMG documented that from 1993 to 2017, 
the increase in global CSR reporting was 93 
percent higher for the G250 big companies 
(the world’s 250 largest companies by revenue 
based on Fortune 500 ranking of  2016). This 
result shows that more and more companies 
are now recognizing CSR reporting as one 
of  the important channels to communicate 
companies’ CSR-related engagements to the 
public. This information is possibly required 
in order to diminish the potential asymmetric 
information that may exist among stakehold-
ers (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). However, 
stakeholders may have few ideas and little in-
formation to better understand the essence 
behind the reported information (Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2017). Thus, environmental, so-
cial, and governance rankings, as the indica-
tors of  CSR performance, are deemed useful 
to measure the effectiveness of  companies’ 
non-financial impacts. Given the interest-
ing issues and the growing phenomenon of  
global CSR reporting, we therefore designed 
this study to identify the association between 
CSR practices, ESG (environmental, social, 
and governance) performance, and asymmet-
ric information.
In this study, we try to shed light on the 
unexplored link between CSR practices, ESG 
performance, and asymmetric information in 
two different stock markets - the Indonesian 
and Portuguese stock exchanges. We consid-
ered these two stock markets to be interest-
ing settings given the CSR-related regulations 
that have been enacted in these two coun-
tries. In most of  the developed countries in 
Europe, non-financial disclosure is regulated 
through Directive 2014/95/EU of  the Eu-
ropean Parliament (European Commission, 
2014), which requires all publicly listed com-
panies in Europe to mandatorily disclose 
their non-financial and diversity information 
to the public. Meanwhile, in the setting of  de-
veloping countries such as Indonesia, man-
datory non-financial information’s disclosure 
through CSR reporting has been enacted 
through a national policy under the article 15 
of  the 2007 investment Law No 25 (Waag-
stein, 2011). However, article 74 of  the 2007 
Limited Liability Corporation Law No 40 
indicates that CSR practices are required for 
companies operating in the sector that has a 
direct relationship with natural resources ex-
ploration (Hendarto, 2009; Waagstein, 2011; 
Famiola and Adiwoso, 2016). Given the insti-
tutional setting’s background of  CSR report-
ing in these two countries, we also envisage 
that the implementation of  CSR practices 
and the association of  ESG performance 
with asymmetric information might behave 
differently between the developed and devel-
oping economies. The study by Muller and 
Kolk, (2009) presented a survey of  CSR per-
formance (i.e., measured by environmental, 
labor, and community dimensions) among 
the Mexican auto industry. They found that 
companies in the emerging-market context 
have tried to resemble the so-called “western 
standards” of  CSR practices from the devel-
oped countries. As a result of  this, the local 
companies indicate some improvements in 
their ways of  dealing with more compara-
ble reporting to what is known about CSR 
in a developed country setting. Yet, this im-
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provement is insufficient and just beyond 
the optimum expectation of  common CSR 
practices in the developed countries. Further-
more, in the literature study of  Brooks and 
Oikonomou, (2018) the relationship between 
CSR performance and financial performance 
generally showed an uncertain shape, wheth-
er it generates linear or non-linear relation-
ship, and forms a particular type of  non-lin-
earity. Therefore, to deal with this puzzle, 
we deliberately proposed two main research 
questions. First, we question whether CSR 
practices are associated with asymmetric in-
formation? Second, we wonder if  the ESG 
performance is associated with asymmetric 
information?
To deal with the proposed research 
questions, we built upon several previous 
works of  literature in addressing our research 
questions. Our first research question was 
whether CSR practices are associated with 
asymmetric information. In regards to the 
utilization of  CSR practices as the main con-
cept, we adopted CSR practices based on the 
study conducted by Michelon, Pilonato, and 
Ricceri, (2015). In their study, they particu-
larly employed the presence of  CSR reports, 
CSR assurance, and Global Reporting Initia-
tive (GRI) adoption as the components of  
any CSR practice, and further tested their as-
sociation with CSR’s disclosure quality. How-
ever, our study is different from the study of  
Michelon, et al., (2015) in terms of  the de-
pendent variable, as we proposed asymmet-
ric information as our dependent variable. 
To further advance this study, we considered 
inserting the information regarding CSR 
committees as one of  the proxies of  CSR 
practices. We assumed that the presence of  
a CSR committee is relevant as it has a par-
ticular role in helping the company shape its 
management decisions regarding the CSR-re-
lated policies. Moreover, to empirically mani-
fest the concept of  asymmetric information, 
we followed the studies of  Cho, Lee, and 
Pfeiffer, (2013), Fuhrmann, Ott, Looks, and 
Guenther, (2017), and Usman and Yennita, 
(2018) by utilizing the information with re-
spect to the bid-ask spread value. We used the 
spread as the proxy of  asymmetric informa-
tion due to its ability to reflect the current 
condition of  information absorbed by the 
market (Ding and Hou, 2015).
Our second research question aimed to 
identify whether ESG performance relates to 
asymmetric information. This research ques-
tion was developed by referring to the pre-
vious studies testing the association between 
CSR (ESG) performance and asymmetric in-
formation. Among them, the study of  Cho, 
Lee, and Pfeiffer, (2013) provided an empiri-
cal base of  study where they documented that 
there is a negative association between CSR 
performance (ESG performance) and asym-
metric information (bid-ask spread). Their 
findings reported that the negative associa-
tion between CSR performance and bid-ask 
spread was lower for companies with a high-
er concentration of  institutional investors, 
whilst those companies with a lower level of  
institutional investors underwent a relatively 
higher negative association. In this respect, 
the study of  Nurazi, Usman, and Kananlua, 
(2016) pointed out that the availability of  en-
vironmental and social disclosures may drive 
the investment decisions taken by the buy-
ers and sellers. However, in the order-driven 
market and the equity market system, buyers 
and sellers cannot directly initiate their trans-
action activity since they need a broker to ex-
ecute each transaction (Nurazi et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the up and down of  the bid-ask 
spread is somehow also determined by the 
supply and demand of  the equity and the 
brokers’ participation in the market.
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Overall, our empirical findings showed 
that contemporaneous (t0) CSR practices and 
ESG performance are negatively associated 
with asymmetric information in the current 
year (t0). Utilizing several proxies for CSR 
practices (i.e., CSR report, CSR committee, 
CSR assurance, and GRI) and ESG perfor-
mance (i.e., environmental, social, and gov-
ernance pillar scores), we tested their associa-
tion with asymmetric information, which was 
proxied by the bid-ask spread. The obtained 
empirical outputs, using a stand-alone sample 
of  each particular country, showed that CSR 
practices and ESG performance are negatively 
associated with asymmetric information (bid-
ask spread). In particular, we found that only 
GRI is statistically associated with the bid-ask 
spread. Meanwhile, the remaining hypotheses 
indicated a negative association, which was 
statistically insignificant. Given this empiri-
cal finding, we further tested the robustness 
of  our findings by employing one-year time-
lagged independent variables. The obtained 
output using the pooled sample with lagged 
variables was slightly different from the main 
analysis of  the pooled sample with contem-
poraneous independent variables of  interest. 
However, the result of  the robustness check 
remained consistent with the a priori notion 
in our hypotheses development.
The contribution of  this study is three-
fold. First, this study is the first research to 
deliberately highlight the differences of  two 
institutional settings for the background of  
the study. We utilized two different countries 
in Asia and Europe: Indonesia and Portugal, 
where CSR reporting has become a manda-
tory practice. Second, the findings of  this 
study are relevant to stakeholders, so they 
can better comprehend the relevance of  CSR 
practices and ESG performance in explain-
ing the variation of  asymmetric information. 
Third, the extensive literature has provided 
the test for the relationship between CSR 
practices–asymmetric information, and ESG 
(CSR) performance–asymmetric informa-
tion. However, no prior study provides the 
empirical test by presenting these three con-
cepts at the same time in the same proposed 
research model. Thus, we are aiming at en-
riching the literature by providing empirical 
evidence on the nexus between CSR practic-
es–asymmetric information, and ESG (CSR) 
performance–asymmetric information.
The remainder of  this paper is struc-
tured as follows. The section for the literature 
review and hypotheses development provides 
the theoretical base of  the proposed hypoth-
eses. The research method section elaborates 
on the sample’s selection, the operational 
definition of  the variables, the data’s collec-
tion, and the predictive regression model. 
The findings of  the study are provided and 
discussed in the results and discussion sec-
tion. The last section has the concluding re-
marks together with the implication and the 
study’s limitation. 
Literature Review and Hy-
potheses Development
CSR Practices and Asymmetric infor-
mation
We use legitimacy theory and the signal-
ing theory as the underlying reason behind 
our hypotheses development. As previously 
stated by Suchman, (1995 p. 574) legitimacy 
theory is defined as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the action of  an entity is 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of  norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.” Meanwhile, the sig-
naling theory, as stated by Stiglitz, (2002 p. 
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473) indicates that “some individuals wish 
to convey information and others wish not 
to have information conveyed, but in either 
case, the fact that actions to convey particu-
lar items of  information lead people to alter 
their behavior,” and this is why information 
imperfections have such a profound effect. 
As reported by Connelly, Certo, Ireland, 
and Reutzel, (2011) the signaling theory and 
asymmetric information have a close rela-
tionship and provide a unique, practical, and 
testable perspective in the setting of  a social 
science study. In particular, the effort to ob-
tain legitimacy and signaling the information 
to the public is conducted by companies in 
their corporate reporting activities (i.e., fi-
nancial or non-financial related information 
disclosures). One of  the types of  reporting 
procedure that we highlighted in this study is 
the disclosure of  non-financial information 
through CSR practices, and its implication 
on the asymmetric information environment. 
Thus, we adopt legitimacy and the signaling 
theory as the base arguments to explain the 
potential relationship between CSR practices 
and asymmetric information.
Regardless of  the potential motives for 
gaining legitimacy and delivering a signal to 
the general public, companies may have sev-
eral options for dealing with their non-finan-
cial information disclosures to the public. 
First, as highlighted by Deegan, Cooper, and 
Shelly, (2006) and Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, 
and LaGore, (2013), companies might choose 
to publish their CSR information through a 
stand-alone report that could be known by 
several names (e.g., a CSR report, CR re-
port, sustainability report, environmental re-
port, ESG report, triple bottom line report, 
and so forth). These reports solely account 
for environmental, social, and governance 
information. Second, companies might em-
ploy integrated reporting, in which CSR-re-
lated information is provided in their annual 
reports (an integrated annual report, regis-
trant report, or consolidated annual report). 
In these forms, CSR-related information is 
provided in a dedicated section of  the report 
(Habek and Wolniak, 2016). Given the nature 
of  the different CSR reporting practices that 
are conducted, based on their comprehensive 
cost-and benefit analysis, companies need to 
make sure that engaging in CSR reporting 
would result in a positive effect on the com-
panies’ performance (Cormier and Magnan, 
2015). 
When the companies have their CSR re-
ports published and disseminated to the pub-
lic, it is expected that the firms’ performances 
will be positively corrected (Lys, Naughton, 
and Wang, 2015). Thus, one of  the indicators 
of  a firm’s performance can be seen from its 
stock liquidity. High liquid stock reflects that 
investors are more likely to pay attention to 
the active stock, which shows the presence of  
low asymmetric information among the mar-
ket participants (Usman and Tandelilin, 2014; 
Nurazi, Usman, and Kananlua, 2016; Nurazi 
and Usman, 2019). Several studies have ex-
amined the relationship between CSR infor-
mation and asymmetric information. Among 
them, Lang and Lundholm, (2000) tested 
corporate disclosure activity near an equity 
offering and its association with stock prices. 
They discovered that in the six months be-
fore the offering is conducted, the firms were 
more likely to dramatically increase their dis-
closure activity, which indicated an effort to 
lower the level of  asymmetric information. 
Moreover, in a more detailed empirical test, 
the study by Cho et al., (2013) presented the 
finding that CSR reporting is associated with 
asymmetric information. Their result showed 
that there is a negative association between 
CSR reports and the bid-ask spread. This 
negative association decreases for companies 
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that are dominated by a high level of  institu-
tional investors, relative to companies with a 
lower level of  institutional investors. Given 
the relationship between CSR practices and 
asymmetric information, we expect that the 
more companies engage in CSR practices 
(CSR reporting), the lower the asymmetric 
information will be.
H1a: CSR reporting is negatively associated with 
asymmetric information.
In Hypothesis 1b, we conjecture that 
the corporate governance mechanism may 
facilitate companies to better observe their 
management and control activities (La Por-
ta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
2000; Nurazi, Santi, and Usman, 2015). Since 
the attention and focus on sustainable de-
velopment is growing profoundly, compa-
nies might need to manage their CSR-related 
decisions professionally, by forming a CSR 
committee (Peters and Romi, 2015). This 
is essential since corporate governance and 
non-financial information disclosure deci-
sions are a complementary mechanism for 
legitimacy practices, that could be used by 
the companies to convey their message to 
the stakeholders and general public (Mich-
elon and Parbonetti, 2012). For this reason, 
we expect that CSR committees may help the 
companies to deal with their CSR-related ac-
tivities in better ways, as the companies with 
CSR committees are supposed to have better 
monitoring mechanisms and policy imple-
mentation for their CSR action plans. Given 
that, we consider that asymmetric informa-
tion which is reflected through the bid-ask 
spread changes can be mitigated to a lower 
level. In addition to this, the knowledge and 
information of  firms’ disclosure activities are 
publicly available and can be utilized by the 
investors or related stakeholders to manage 
their investment decisions (Cho et al., 2013). 
This can also be observed from the per-
spective of  the stakeholders’ points of  view, 
where the presence of  a CSR committee is 
expected to play a positive role in increasing 
stock liquidity and leads to a lower spread in 
the bid-ask price. In this regard, the actions 
taken by the CSR committee through its CSR 
policy in the corporate disclosure represent 
public interests, and may influence investors’ 
purchase decisions (Amran, Lee, and Devi, 
2014). When the CSR committee makes a 
decision and conveys this information to the 
public, we expect that companies are more 
likely to have a higher trading volume, which 
tends to lead to a tighter spread than for those 
companies with a low trading volume. Thus, 
we developed Hypothesis 1b as follows:
H1b: A CSR committee is negatively associated with 
asymmetric information.
Given the voluntary nature of  CSR prac-
tices and their reporting, there is a chance that 
companies may deal with the misappropria-
tion of  the CSR report. Take, for instance, the 
motives of  impression management actions 
(Rutherford, 2003), hypocrisy (Michelon, Pi-
lonato, Ricceri, and Roberts, 2016), using the 
CSR report as a camouflaging tool (Moneva, 
Archel, and Correa, 2006), reputation risk 
management (Bebbington, Larrinaga, and 
Moneva, 2008), and solely ticking the box for 
CSR dimensions might harm the main objec-
tive of  the CSR’s function as the source of  
value-relevance information (Junior and Best, 
2017; Usman, 2020b). Due to the presence 
of  these opportunistic behaviors, it may po-
tentially increase the asymmetric information 
between the report preparer (companies) and 
the report users (the general public). The re-
port preparer might obfuscate the reported 
information so as to make the negative tone 
(i.e., negative news) less recognizable by us-
ing more difficult words. As a result of  this, 
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the content and the essence of  the report 
cannot be fully appreciated by the stake-
holders, as the report’s users. In this respect, 
Bagnoli and Watts, (2017) affirmed that it is 
the company that knows very well the actual 
level of  its CSR engagement, as the compa-
ny has the opportunity to manage and select 
the type of  information it prefers to disclose 
voluntarily. Meanwhile, the stakeholders can 
only observe this information through the fi-
nal CSR report published by the company. To 
reduce this asymmetrical information condi-
tion, companies are expected to fairly and 
truthfully disclose their non-financial infor-
mation to the public. However, even though 
companies have reported their non-financial 
dealings through many different reports and 
channels, there could still be the veiled op-
portunity that companies misuse their CSR 
reports to manage their stakeholders’ per-
ceptions (Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell, 1998; 
Bebbington et al., 2008; Birkey, Michelon, 
Patten, and Sankara, 2016; E and Y, 2017). 
Given that, the credibility and reliability of  
CSR reports are highly uncertain, doubted, 
and often questioned by the stakeholders 
(Hodge, Subramaniam, and Stewart, 2009; 
Briem and Wald, 2018). In order to anticipate 
criticism of  the credibility and reliability of  
the information disclosed in the CSR report, 
companies are recommended to have their 
reports vetted by a third, independent, party 
(Mercer, 2004; Moroney et al., 2011; Cho, Mi-
chelon, Patten, and Roberts, 2014; Romero, 
Fernandez-Feijoo, and Ruiz, 2014).
 Engaging with the vetting practice 
may indicate a positive signal of  companies’ 
readiness to being scrutinized by a third-par-
ty (i.e., assurance provider1)(Manurung and 
1The vetting service providers of  CSR information can be profes-
sional accountants (i.e., BigN vs. NonBigN) and non-accountants 
(e.g., consultancy firms; environmental consultants, environmental 
and engineering consultants, environmental research organizations, 
and so forth) (Deegan et al., 2006; Manurung and Basuki, 2010; 
Moroney et al., 2011; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua, 2009). 
Basuki, 2010; Moroney et al., 2011; Lys et al., 
2015). The study by Fuhrmann, Ott, Looks, 
and Guenther, (2017) revealed that using a 
matched sample (CSR reports with vs. with-
out assurance) from 442 STOXX 600 Euro-
pean companies, checking the contents of  
the CSR reports using a high-quality vetting 
process was negatively associated with asym-
metric information proxied by the bid-ask 
spread. Meanwhile, they also showed that 
CSR reports with a moderate vetting level 
are deemed insufficient, as a vetting process 
that ensures only a moderate level of  certain-
ty is not significantly associated with the de-
crease of  information asymmetry. Thus, we 
conjecture that having the CSR report vetted 
and certified might help the stakeholders to 
truncate the level of  asymmetric information 
between the company, as the report’s prepar-
er, and the stakeholders as the report’s users. 
Taking into consideration the above discus-
sion, we proposed Hypothesis 1c as follows:
H1c: CSR vetting is negatively associated with 
asymmetric information.
 Prior studies have documented that 
there is no particular or specific format that 
should be adopted by companies when deal-
ing with CSR reporting. However, more and 
more non-profit organizations are devel-
oping and providing frameworks that focus 
on helping the companies disclose the par-
ticular non-financial information metrics of  
their CSR dimensions (Pérez, 2015; Pope and 
Wæraas, 2016; Khan, Serafeim, and Yoon, 
2016). Take, for instance, the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI), which is one of  the most 
adopted disclosure frameworks (Brown, de 
Jong, and Levy, 2009; GRI, 2014; Hahn and 
Lulfs, 2014). GRI has been developed, mod-
ified, and evolved over time, based on the 
information needs of  stakeholders. A num-
ber of  the non-financial metric parameters 
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in GRI are deemed to be alternative tools to 
better quantify non-financial information, 
so as to make it more measurable and com-
parable. If  a company does not adopt any 
framework for its CSR reporting, there is a 
probability that the published information 
does not comprehensively cover the material 
information, and is most likely to be seen as 
a less standardized and less comparable re-
port (Deegan et al., 2006; Khan et al., 2016). 
Therefore, GRI’s adoption to some extent 
expresses a signal that companies have a 
higher commitment to more organized CSR 
reporting. In this context, the GRI’s disclo-
sure framework also covers broader aspects, 
which capture and reflect the non-financial 
indicators of  the environmental, social, and 
governance impacts of  firms’ activities (GRI, 
2014). As a result of  this, stakeholders (inves-
tors) may utilize the information in a CSR re-
port as a source of  value-relevance informa-
tion to mitigate the asymmetric information. 
Hypothesis 1d is organized as follows:
H1d: The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is neg-
atively associated with asymmetric information.
ESG Performance and Asym-
metric information
An ESG performance score is created 
based on the evaluation of  the available CSR 
reports made to the public. CSR ranking in-
stitutions (e.g., Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
Bloomberg, KLD, Sustainalytics, Reputation 
Institute, and so forth) use the voluntary 
disclosure documents released by the com-
panies to assess their environmental, social, 
and governance impacts. In this regard, 
the companies’ sincerity and their commit-
ment to ESG aspects can be seen from their 
ESG-related expenditure, and how this activ-
ity is reported to the public (Steinmeier and 
Stich, 2017; Yoon, Lee, and Ryan, 2018). Pri-
or studies have well-documented that ESG 
performance scores help the stakeholders to 
better understand the degree of  impact the 
companies have with respect to their ESG 
activities (Benlemlih, Shaukat, Qiu, and Tro-
janowski, 2016). Take, for example, Dhaliw-
al, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang, (2012) 
who reported that CSR information can be 
used by professional stakeholders (i.e., finan-
cial analysts, institutional investors, securities 
companies, etc.) to reduce the condition of  
asymmetric information as indicated by the 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy through 
the analysts’ forecast error and analysts’ earn-
ings dispersion for three different forecast 
horizons (t0, t+1, and t+2). When Benlemlih 
et al., (2016) extended the study of  Dhaliwal 
et al., (2012) using environmental and social 
disclosure performance scores, they found 
a negative relationship between these dis-
closure scores and companies’ total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. They pointed out that the 
presence of  non-financial information is val-
ue relevant in reducing the potential risks for 
the stakeholders. Moreover, CSR information 
is also considered useful for green investors2, 
who pay more attention not only to a busi-
ness’s sustainability but also to its resource’s 
and environmental sustainability. Given that, 
the professional and non-professional stake-
holders may simply capture the relevance 
of  ESG performance scores to mitigate the 
level of  asymmetric information. In this re-
gard, ESG performance scores could be in-
terpreted as the signal that a better score is 
more likely to indicate lower asymmetric in-
formation, as the companies become more 
responsible, accountable, and transparent in 
their ESG activities. Therefore, we hypothe-
sized that the environmental, social, and gov-
2Investors who hold securities listed in the so-called “green equi-
ty indexes” e.g., SandP 500 Environmental and Socially Respon-
sible Index, Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy Index (CELS), 
FTSE Green Revenues Index Series, Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index, and so forth.
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ernance performance scores are negatively 
associated with asymmetric information.
H2a: The environmental score is negatively associated 
with asymmetric information.
H2b: The social score is negatively associated with 
asymmetric information.
H2c: The governance score is negatively associated 
with asymmetric information.
Research Design
To better manifest the proposed con-
ceptual idea and its technical measures, we 
designed our study as a research model. The 
following boxes in Figure 1 show the pro-
posed relationship links between the main 
concepts, as well as the operationalization of  
the conceptual ideas into several surrogate 
indicators.
Figure 1 displays the research model 
for our study. In the model, we distinguish 
between the proposed conceptual idea, and 
further manifest the idea into measurable 
parameters. As seen in the boxes, the main 
idea is proposing the empirical test for the 
relationship between CSR practices, ESG 
performance, and asymmetric information. 
CSR practices are further operationalized by 
employing several variables such as: the avail-
ability of  CSR reports, the presence of  CSR 
committees, the vetting of  CSR reports, and 
the adoption of  the GRI framework. ESG 
performance is proxied by the environmental, 
social, and governance performance scores. 
To technically operationalize the asymmetric 
information, we used the bid-ask spread val-
ue.
Methods
Sample and Data Collection
The sample of  our study is taken from 
two countries (Portugal and Indonesia). We 
particularly chose these two countries be-
cause of  their institutional settings, which are 
related to their regional non-financial report-
ing regulations. In substance, Portugal has 
recently been facing mandatory non-financial 
and diversity information disclosure through 
the European Directive No 95/2015/EU 
(European Commission, 2014). Meanwhile, 
Figure 1. Research model
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non-financial disclosure and its reporting 
have been enacted in Indonesia since 2007, 
specifically through the national policy under 
the article 15 of  the 2007 investment Law No 
25, which obliged every corporation to imple-
ment CSR activity (Waagstein, 2011). Howev-
er, even though the mandatory reporting of  
non-financial information has been enacted, 
the procedure for non-financial disclosure 
and its reporting are still unstructured. Thus, 
we have adopted purposive sampling tech-
niques with several criteria for screening the 
potential sample. The first of  these criteria is 
that the sample (company) should be publicly 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and/
or the Portuguese Stock Exchange. Second, 
we focus on a number of  companies that were 
consistently listed during the time period of  
our observation (from 2012 to 2016). Third, 
the company should have published at least 
one CSR report during the period of  observa-
tion. Fourth, the company should be covered 
by the CSR ranking institution (the ASSET4) 
to enable us to collect complete data on the 
ESG performance scores. Last, the company 
should have had complete financial data.
Regarding the data’s collection, we main-
ly extracted our financial and non-financial in-
formation from Thomson Reuters. The data 
on CSR practices and ESG-related variables 
(e.g., sustainability ranking with respect to 
environmental, social, and governance per-
formance pillar scores) were extracted from 
the ASSET4 database, and financial-related 
information was extracted from the EIKON 
datastream. Moreover, the data on our main 
dependent variable (asymmetric information) 
is proxied by calculating the bid-ask spread 
value. We are aware that our main indepen-
dent variables (i.e., CSR practices and ESG 
performance) cannot fully explain the varia-
tion of  asymmetric information. As pointed 
out by Lennox, Francis, and Wang, (2012), 
most of  the implications of  the accounting 
and finance policies are considered as choice-
based decisions, because of  many endogenous 
factors. Thus, we acknowledge that our model 
could potentially be harmed by an endogene-
ity problem (i.e., omitted correlated variable 
bias). To handle this issue, we further decided 
to insert several firm-specific variables as ad-
ditional control variables. These control vari-
ables were adopted from the previous studies 
which are commonly used by researchers in 
the CSR arena. The sampling procedure of  
our study is available as follows.
Regression Model
 Our study used panel data analy-
sis which combined the cross-sectional and 
time-series data analyses. More specifically, 
we use the data from 37 companies or 185 
Table 1. Sample selection procedure
No Sample construction procedure Indonesia Portugal Pooled sample
(n) (obs) (n) (obs) (n) (obs)
1 Total companies listed on the capital markets 
(current data in the last semester of  2018).
592 2,960 68 340 660 3,300
2 Companies with no CSR report as covered by 
ASSET4 database from 2012 to 2016.
(564) (2,820) (59) (295) (623) (3,115)
3 Companies with complete yearly-observations 
and fundamental financial data from 2012 to 
2016.
28 140 9 45 37 185
Note: (n) = Number of companies
 (obs) = Company-yearly observations
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company year-observations (28 Indonesian; 
140 company-year observations, and 9 Por-
tuguese; (45 company-year observations)) 
which are observed from a different point 
in time. In this regard, the time-series data 
were taken for a five years series, spanning 
from 2012 to 2016. According to the opinion 
of  Pedhazur, (1997) and Baltagi, (2008), the 
within-subject information (cross-sectional 
data with 37 public listed companies) and 
across time (2012-2016) are combined in the 
process of  panel data analysis estimations. 
The result from the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model shows the error 
variance for different cross-section units 
which corresponds to the presence of  het-
eroskedasticity. Thus, the standard error, as 
obtained from this OLS estimation, is con-
sidered inconsistent. To tackle this issue, we 
employed a panel corrected standard error 
model which assumes that the standard er-
rors within the unit (cross-sectional) are ho-
moscedastic (Usman, 2019). Finally, we ran 
the following statistical model by employing 
robust variance estimates, and robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the year and firm lev-
els.
Spread 1CSR rep 2CSR com
3CSR ass 4GRI 5ENVscr 6SOCscr
7GOVscr Controls Year Industry .
i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
a b b






The dependent variable in this study is 
asymmetric information. To empirically test 
this concept, we used the bid-ask spread value 
(Spreadi,t) as the proxy of  asymmetric infor-
mation. We used this variable since the differ-
ence in the bid and ask price may represent 
the different types of  information owned by 
the companies as insiders, and stakeholders 
as the outsiders in the market. With respect 
to its data form, we use the annual spread 
data as indicated by firm i in year t.
Independent Variables
The subscript i means firm i and the sub-
script t means the annual time (year t). To ex-
plain the variation of  the dependent variable 
(Spreadi,t), we used seven main independent 
variables (CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass, 
GRI, ENVscr, SOCscr, and GOVscr). These 
variables represent the idea of  CSR prac-
tices and ESG performance. In particular, 
the concept of  CSR practices is empirically 
tested by employing four variables, namely 
CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass, and GRI. The 
ESG performance is surrogate by three per-
formance scores namely ENVscr, SOCscr, 
and GOVscr. In detail, CSR_rep means the 
availability of  CSR information. We mark 
companies either with a stand-alone report, 
or CSR information provided in a dedicated 
section in the annual report as 1, and 0 oth-
erwise. CSR_com denotes the availability of  
a CSR committee. We mark 1 if  the compa-
nies have CSR committees and 0 otherwise. 
CSR_ass stands for external vetting of  the 
CSR documents. Companies with certified 
CSR reports are marked 1 and 0 otherwise. 
GRI denotes the Global Reporting Initiative. 
GRI is a disclosure framework used by com-
panies when they are dealing with their CSR 
disclosures. In this regard, we also used a bi-
nary variable, in which the companies who 
adopted the GRI framework are marked 1, 
and 0 otherwise. ENVscr is the environmen-
tal pillar score, as published by the ASSET4 
database for the related sample. This variable 
is generated in a continuous form from 0 as 
the lowest score and 100 as the highest score. 
Moreover, SOCscr and GOVscr denote the 
social and governance pillar scores as pub-
lished by the ASSET4 database. The data of  
SOCscr and GOVscr are provided in a con-
tinuous form, as well as the data of  ENVscr.
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Control Variables
We were aware that the OLS regres-
sion we used in the proposed model could 
be harmed by the problem of  endogeneity, 
particularly the issue of  omitted correlated 
variable bias. Therefore, to neutralize the 
main effect of  the independent variables 
on the variation of  the dependent variable, 
and the potential effect of  the non-existence 
variables in the proposed model, we decided 
to use control variables. Following the previ-
ous studies, we used several financial infor-
mation items as our control variables. These 
financial-related variables are: SIZE which 
is calculated based on the natural logarithm 
(NL) value of  the total asset. LEV denotes 
the leverage ratio, calculated by dividing the 
total debt to total equity, and ROA stands for 
the return on assets. Meanwhile, in order to 
strengthen the empirical estimation, we also 
utilized a variable that represents the good 
governance mechanism. We labeled this vari-
able “Boardsize,” which is calculated as the 
total number of  board members. 
Apart from the utilization of  control 
variables, we also tested the year fixed-effect 
and industry fixed-effect. Besides, we used 
an additional variable named ESIs (environ-
mentally sensitive industries) to distinguish 
if  the companies were operating in environ-
mentally sensitive industries, relative to other 
industries. The complete information with 




In this section, we provide our elabora-
tion of  the obtained data from Indonesia and 
Portugal. Besides presenting the subset data 
Table 2. Variable definitions
Variable Definition Data form Source
Spread Bid-Ask spread: ask price – bid price / ((ask price + bid price) / 2). Continuous EIKON
CSR_rep CSR report: 1 if  the companies publish a stand-alone or CSR information 
in a dedicated section in the annual report, 0 otherwise.
Binary ASSET4
CSR_com CSR committee: 1 if  the companies have CSR committee and 0 otherwise. Binary ASSET4
CSR_ass CSR assurance: 1 if  the CSR report is vetted by an external independent 
third-party.
Binary ASSET4
GRI Global Reporting Initiatives: 1 if  the companies adopt the GRI framework, 
0 otherwise.
Binary ASSET4
ENVscr Environmental score: environmental pillar score as provided by ASSET4 
database.
Continuous ASSET4
SOCscr Social score: social pillar score as provided by ASSET4 database. Continuous ASSET4
GOVscr Governance score: governance pillar score as provided by the ASSET4 
database.
Continuous ASSET4
SIZE Company size: natural logarithm (NL) of  total assets. Continuous EIKON
LEV Leverage: total debt / total equity. Continuous EIKON
ROA Return on Asset: total return / total asset. Continuous EIKON
Boardsize The total number of  board members. Continuous EIKON
ESIs Environmentally Sensitive Industries: 1 if  the companies operating in envi-
ronmentally sensitive industries (electric, gas, oil, paper & forest products, 
pharmaceuticals), 0 otherwise.
Binary ASSET4
Notes: Table 2 provides the plot for variable definition, data form, and the source of  dataset. The employed variables are 
adopted from various sources of  literature and we further combine them in our empirical test.
Usman et al
163
from Indonesia and Portugal separately, we 
also pooled all the data in a panel data form. 
The information with respect to the descrip-
tive statistics analysis is available as follows. 
Table 3 illustrates.
Table 3 explains the information re-
garding the main independent, dependent, 
and control variables. Table 1 is divided into 
three panels. Panel A is the dependent vari-
able in which we use the bid-ask spread as 
the proxy of  asymmetric information. The 
information shows that the mean of  Spread 
for the pooled sample is 0.008, while the 
means of  the subsets sample for the Indo-
nesian and Portuguese groups are 0.006 and 
0.016 respectively. Panel B indicates the main 
independent variables information. As previ-
ously highlighted in the research model, the 
main independent variable is divided into two 
major ideas, namely CSR practices and ESG 
performance. With respect to CSR practices, 
we employ four main variables (i.e., CSR_rep, 
CSR_com, CSR_ass, and GRI). As can be 
seen in Table 1, the pooled sample shows 
that 66.5 percent of  all the sample compa-
nies have published their CSR-related infor-
mation, either in a stand-alone form or as a 
piece of  dedicated information in the annu-
al report. In more detail, the subsample of  
Indonesian companies reports that 62.1 per-
cent of  the companies have dealt with non-fi-
nancial reporting, while this number is higher 
for the Portuguese companies (80 percent on 
average). With regard to the information on 
ESG performance, each dimension of  the 
ESG score shows that in the pooled sample, 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable
Mean









Panel A. Dependent variable
Spread 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.405
Panel B. Independent variables
CSR_rep 0.665 0.621 0.800 0.473 0 1 1 0 1
CSR_com 0.395 0.271 0.778 0.490 0 0 1 0 1
CSR_ass 0.232 0.143 0.511 0.424 0 0 0 0 1
GRI 0.400 0.364 0.511 0.491 0 0 1 0 1
ENVscr 47.344 40.600 68.323 22.867 26.549 48.529 69.196 8.114 92.445
SOCscr 57.100 54.072 66.519 22.901 40.723 61.202 76.559 8.157 92.597
GOVscr 49.128 47.010 55.719 20.632 31.733 49.202 64.959 8.255 87.822
Panel C. Control variables
SIZE 22.681 22.597 22.941 0.736 22.598 22.598 22.598 19.549 25.220
LEV 167.434 158.518 195.174 463.245 29.095 64.170 106.638 0.000 2,834
ROA 6.967 9.597 -1.216 13.581 2.229 4.187 11.254 -90.848 48.775
Boardsize 9.151 6.871 16.244 5.314 6 7 10 3 26
ESIs 0.297 0.286 0.333 0.458 0 0 1 0 1
Data source: Thomson Reuters EIKON and ASSET4 database, for years 2012-2016. 
Notes: Table 4 indicates the information regarding the descriptive statistics of  the research variables and some key 
financial data as the control variables. Also, several continuous variables (i.e., SIZE, LEV, ROA) are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the mean score for the environmental pillar 
score (ENVscr) is 47.34 percent on aver-
age. In addition to this, the social pillar score 
(SOCscr) stands as 57.1 and the governance 
pillar score (GOVscr) is 49.12 percent on av-
erage. In a more specific comparison between 
the Indonesian and Portuguese data, it can be 
seen that the ESG performance scores from 
Portugal are higher than those of  Indone-
sian companies. In Panel C, the information 
on the control variables shows that in terms 
of  size, the Portuguese companies are rela-
tively bigger than Indonesian companies. It 
can be seen through the SIZE value (natural 
logarithm of  the total asset) of  Indonesian 
companies which is slightly smaller (22.597) 
than that for Portuguese companies (22.941). 
However, in terms of  leverage (total debt to 
total equity), Indonesian companies have less 
debt (158.518) as compared to their peers 
(Portugal; 195.174). Indonesian companies 
also indicate a positive (9.579) return on as-
sets (ROA) while Portuguese companies are 
inclined to show a negative (-1.216) ROA on 
average. In the next section, we proceed into 
the correlation analysis.
The output in Table 4 presents the ba-
sic correlation between the dependent vari-
able, the main independent variables, and the 
control variables. Referring to the correla-
tion analysis output, it can be seen how CSR 
practices (CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass, and 
GRI), ESG performance scores (ENVscr, 
SOCscr, and GOVscr), and asymmetric in-
formation (Spread) are correlated with each 
other. The obtained empirical test shows that 
among the seven main independent variables 
and control variables, only SOCscr indicates 
a negative and significant (p < 0.1) correla-
tion with the dependent variable (Spread). 
However, it is worth reporting that this out-
put is obtained by employing the pooled 
sample with 185 observations. To be con-
vinced that the obtained correlation analysis 
is robust for different simulations, we also 
performed an additional correlation analysis 
by distinguishing the subset of  each sample 
according to its country groups (the infor-
mation about this test was un-tabulated due 
to the limited space). The results using two 
different sub-sample groups reveal that only 
GRI adoption, as the proxy of  CSR prac-
tices, shows a negative correlation with the 
Indonesian Spread, while none of  the sam-
ples from the Portuguese companies adopted 
the GRI reporting framework in our dataset. 
Moreover, in respect of  ESG performance 
and its relationship with Spread, ENVscr, 
SOCscr, and GOVscr displayed a negative 
association with the Indonesian Spread. The 
negative coefficient signs can also be seen in 
the correlation between SOCscr, GOVscr 
and the Portuguese Spread. 
Hypotheses Testing
In this subsection, we proceed with the 
hypotheses testing by providing the findings 
of  the panel data analysis’s results. As previ-
ously explained in the research method sec-
tion, we used three different sample groups. 
Given the setting of  the study used data from 
two countries, we deliberately used the data 
taken from each individual country as the 
subset of  the overall sample (Indonesia and 
Portugal). We also provide empirical results 
by employing the pooled data as the third 
sample group. The details of  the panel data 
analysis in our hypotheses testing are avail-
able as follows.
Table 5 contains the empirical panel data 
analysis. The obtained outputs indicate that 
the subsample sets both from Indonesia and 
Portugal and the pooled sample show relative-
ly inconsistent results. In particular, we firstly 
tested the association between CSR practices 
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Table 5. Main panel data analysis
Spread 1CSR rep 2CSR com 3CSR ass 4GRI 5ENVscr 6SOCscr
7GOVscr Controls Year Industry .
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
= + + + + + + +
+ + +




 VARIABLES Expected sign
(1) (2) (3)
Indonesia Portugal Pooled
CSR_rep - -0.0059 0.0979 -0.0109
[-1.5943] [1.4721] [-1.6515]
CSR_com - 0.0026 0.1120 0.0312
[1.1304] [1.6816] [0.8914]
CSR_ass - 0.0021 -0.0569 -0.0047
[0.7000] [-1.6350] [-0.6714]
GRI - -0.0031 -0.0144
[-1.8235]* [-0.8622]
ENVscr - -0.0000545 0.0007 -0.0000646
[-0.7686] [0.7777] [-0.3230]
SOCscr - -0.0000271 -0.0051 -0.0004
[-0.4874] [-2.125]* [-1.000]
GOVscr - -0.0000461 -0.0000860 -0.0000229
[-0.7305] [-0.1228] [-0.2958]
SIZE +/- 0.1470 0.0579 0.0002
[2.7788]*** [1.6495] [0.0294]
LEV +/- 0.00000560 0.00000136 0.00000258
[6.3063]*** [0.0334] [0.5108]
ROA +/- 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
[2.3501]* [0.500] [1.000]
Boardsize +/- 0.0013 -0.0200 0.0003
[1.0833] [-1.5384] [0.250]
ESIs +/- 0.0026 -0.2410 -0.0423
[0.400] [-1.6506] [-0.755]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Se Cluster Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.326*** -0.864 0.0405
[-2.7786] [-1.0884] [0.2736]
Observations 140 45 185
R-squared 0.295 0.692 0.212
Notes: t statistics are available in the brackets. Each asterisk indicates statistical significance where; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 respectively using a two-tail test. This Table reports the results of  panel data analysis 
estimation using equation 1. The dependent variable is the asymmetric information (Spread) and the Inde-
pendent variablesare CSR practice (i.e., CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass, and GRI) and ESG performance (i.e., 
ENVscr, SOCscr, and GOVscr). In the empirical test, we deliberately carried out the panel data regression 
using three sample groups. All the specifications in the model are estimated using OLS regression by including 




and asymmetric information. In this regard, 
we tested the first four hypotheses to identi-
fy the association of  CSR report (CSR_rep), 
CSR committee (CSR_com), CSR assurance 
(CSR_ass) and GRI framework (GRI) with 
Spread. In Hypothesis 1a, we hypothesized 
that CSR report is negatively associated with 
asymmetric information (spread). The em-
pirical evidence of  Hypothesis 1a shows that 
the coefficient value of  CSR report (CSR_
rep) is negative but insignificantly associated 
with asymmetric information (Spread). The 
obtained result indicates a consistent output 
where the test of  Hypothesis 1a using In-
donesia (β= -0.0059), Portugal (β= 0.0979), 
and the pooled sample (β= -0.0109) groups 
show no statistical association (p > 0.1) be-
tween CSR report and asymmetric informa-
tion (Spread). Given this result, we report 
that Hypothesis 1a is unsupported. We fur-
ther continued by testing Hypothesis 1b. In 
Hypothesis 1b, we argued that CSR com-
mittee (CSR_com) is negatively associated 
with asymmetric information (Spread). The 
results show that neither the Indonesian (β= 
0.0026)), Portuguese (β= 0.1120) nor the 
pooled samples (β= 0.0312) indicated any 
significant association (p > 0.1) with asym-
metric information (Spread). Therefore, we 
report that Hypothesis 1b is also statistically 
unsupported. The tesing further proceeded 
to Hypothesis 1c. In Hypothesis 1c we as-
sumed that CSR assurance (CSR_ass) is neg-
atively associated with asymmetric informa-
tion (Spread). The empirical result noted that 
none of  the subsample sets (Indonesian (β= 
0.0021) and Portuguese (β= -0.0569) com-
panies) and the whole sample (pooled; β= 
-0.0047) showed a significant association (p 
> 0.1) with asymmetric information (Spread). 
In this case, we report that Hypothesis 1c is 
unsupported. The last test on the association 
between CSR practice and asymmetric infor-
mation was conducted by testing Hypothesis 
1d. In this test, we expected that the adop-
tion of  GRI framework would be negative-
ly associated with asymmetric information 
(Spread). The test using the pooled sample 
(β= -0.0144) did not indicate any association 
(p > 0.1) while the Portuguese sample had 
no observations of  GRI adoption. However, 
the test using the Indonesian sample group 
showed that there is a negative (β= -0.0031) 
and significant association at a ten percent 
level (p < 0.1) of  alpha on the relationship 
between GRI and Spread. Thus, we docu-
ment that this result provides weak support 
for Hypothesis 1d.
Moreover, we tested the association be-
tween ESG performance and asymmetric in-
formation (Spread). This test is shown by the 
output test of  hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. Re-
garding the direct test using the environmen-
tal score (ENVscr) as the main independent 
variable of  Hypothesis 2a, it can be seen that 
none of  the tests using three sample groups 
(Indonesian β= -0.0000545; Portuguese β= 
0.0007; and pooled β= -0.0000646) showed 
any significant association (p > 0.1) between 
ENVscr and Spread. This means that Hy-
pothesis 2a is statistically unsupported. In 
Hypothesis 2b, we argued that social perfor-
mance, which is represented by the social pil-
lar score (SOCscr), is associated with asym-
metric information. The test showed that 
only the test with the Portuguese subsample 
set indicated a negative (β= -0.0051) and a sig-
nificant association at a ten percent level (p < 
0.1). While in the Indonesian (β= -0.0000271) 
and pooled samples (β= -0.0004), the ob-
tained coefficient values of  SOCscr showed 
negative signs but did not indicate any signifi-
cant association (p > 0.1). Given the obtained 
significance level which stands at ten percent, 
we report that Hypothesis 2b is weakly sup-
ported. The last hypothesis testing goes to 
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Hypothesis 2c, which tested the association 
between governance performance (GOV-
scr) and asymmetric information (Spread). 
Similar to the previous result from the ESG 
test, the governance score showed negative 
coefficient values (Indonesia β=-0.0000461; 
Portugal β= -0.0000860; and pooled sample 
β= -0.0000229) but all were statistically insig-
nificant (p > 0.1).
Discussion
Our study investigates the associations 
between CSR practices, ESG performance, 
and asymmetric information. Recalling the 
results of  our main analysis, we document 
that most of  the proposed hypotheses are 
statistically unsupported. We conjecture 
that CSR practices, as proxied by CSR_rep, 
CSR_com, CSR_ass, and GRI, are associated 
with asymmetric information, as surrogated 
by the bid-ask spread (Spread). However, the 
obtained outputs using the data from two dif-
ferent countries do not completely meet and 
support our ideas. The supported hypothesis 
(H1d) indicates that there is a weak relation-
ships between CSR practices and asymmetric 
information, since only a proxy of  our main 
independent variable (i.e., GRI) showed a 
weak relationship with the main dependent 
variable (Spread). In more detail, our find-
ings provide the result that the presence of  
a CSR report (CSR_rep) does not necessarily 
seem value relevant in truncating the level of  
asymmetric information. Irrespective of  the 
CSR-related information being provided ei-
ther in a stand-alone report or combined in 
the annual report, the evidence from Portu-
gal and Indonesia documents an inconclusive 
result, as compared with our a priori notion 
and the previous study of  Fuhrmann et al., 
(2017) and Usman and Yennita, (2018). Giv-
en this circumstance, we claim that our result 
is slightly similar to the findings of  Miche-
lon, Pilonato, and Ricceri, (2015). They tested 
the relationship between CSR practices and 
CSR disclosure quality. In their study, CSR 
reports appeared as one of  the proxies of  
CSR practices. They noted that CSR report-
ing, whether it is provided in the form of  a 
stand-alone report or integrated into the an-
nual report, does not associate with the quali-
ty of  the CSR disclosure. This means that the 
disclosed non-financial information is mostly 
described as a symbolic action, which is tak-
en by the companies just to show the public 
that they have been dealing with CSR-related 
activities. In our case, we find that there is 
no association between CSR reporting and 
asymmetric information (Spread), which 
confirms that the presence of  CSR reports, 
to some extent, do not seem value relevant 
to diminish the level of  asymmetric informa-
tion, as depicted by the changes in the bid-ask 
spread. The potential explanation of  this pe-
culiar output could be linked with the finding 
of  Michelon et al., (2015). Even though their 
study was conducted using UK companies, 
one of  the countries with a very strict and 
advanced method of  non-financial informa-
tion reporting, yet the reported and the pub-
lished information is considered to be less 
substantive and contains deficiencies. Among 
them, they pointed out the issue of  a lack of  
completeness due to the voluntary nature of  
CSR reporting, which does not require a par-
ticular standard of  information disclosure. 
They also stressed that the point of  creating a 
CSR report, and disclosing it to the public, is 
mainly driven by the managers’ opportunistic 
behavior, in which the main motive could be 
due to the effort to manage the stakehold-
ers’ perceptions and to gain public legitima-
cy. Even so, another prior study undertaken 
by Usman and Yennita, (2018) showed that 
environmental and social scores are negative-
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ly associated with asymmetric information. 
They carried out the study using Indonesian 
companies as the sample for their study. We 
presume that the inconclusive results we have 
may be driven by the different data forms, as 
used by Usman andYennita’s (2018) study, in 
which they focused more on using the quar-
terly data while we used the yearly data.
With respect to the consequences of  
increasing information disclosures and the 
concerns about different types of  data, Leuz 
and Verrecchia, (2000) and Botosan and Har-
ris (2000), in their studies, highlighted that 
the motivation for a change in disclosure 
frequency is linear with its economic con-
sequences. Botosan and Harris (2000) doc-
umented that the change in disclosure fre-
quency can enhance both the content and the 
timeliness of  the information disclosed to the 
public. They argued that if  the management 
considers a particular segment of  informa-
tion to be important for an investment-relat-
ed decision, the timeliness of  the reporting is 
more likely to be enhanced through the quar-
terly reporting format than the yearly form. 
This is due to the usefulness of  information 
that is provided in a timely manner to inves-
tors, and made available to the public, so as 
to allow the investors to create instantaneous 
buying, selling, or holding decisions for par-
ticular stocks. This argument is also relevant 
to the findings of  Usman and Yennita, (2018) 
who used quarterly data from Indonesian 
companies. They tested the relationship be-
tween CSR practices and asymmetric infor-
mation, and they found that CSR practices 
are negatively and significantly associated 
with asymmetric information (i.e., proxied 
by a quarterly bid-ask spread and stock price 
volatility). Even though using quarterly data 
provides different results, compared with 
the yearly data in our study, we argue that 
this phenomenon might happen due to the 
yearly reporting pattern that does not reveal 
the seasonal trends and time-varying factors 
which are less observable in the annual data. 
Therefore, Botosan and Harris, (2000), Us-
man and Yennita, (2018) and Usman, (2020a) 
suggested increasing the voluntary disclosure 
information to a quarterly time-based fre-
quency, rather than using the annual-based 
information reporting.
Recalling the variation of  asymmetric 
information, our results report that, from 
the perspective of  investors, there could be 
a considerable number of  factors that may 
drive investors’decisions in their investment 
activities. In this regard, investors need more 
information to reduce the level of  asymmet-
ric information among the market partic-
ipants. With this, the effort to diminish the 
level of  asymmetric information can be done 
by collecting relevant information (financial 
and/or non-financial information) about the 
targeted companies’ stocks. Meanwhile, from 
the perspective of  the companies, as the in-
formation holders and providers, they should 
be able to publicly and promptly convey the 
information to the public (market partici-
pants). The market’s ability to absorb this 
information is mainly depicted through the 
bid-ask price changes. As noted by Nurazi et 
al., (2016), the transaction of  stock trading 
activities in Indonesia adopts the order-driv-
en market system and continuous auction sys-
tem. The alteration of  price changes (up and 
down) indicates the role of  brokers, where 
the buyers and sellers are unable to complete 
the transaction by themselves in the type of  
order-driven market. Thus, the market partic-
ipants (sellers and buyers) need the assistance 
of  a broker to perform their actions. 
Regarding the obtained evidence using 
the Portuguese setting, we also find that none 
of  the proxies of  CSR practices have shown a 
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significant association with asymmetric infor-
mation. However, one of  the proxies of  ESG 
performance (SOCscr) displays a negative 
and significant association with asymmetric 
information (Spread). Similar to the results 
from the Indonesian setting, CSR practices 
are not associated with asymmetric informa-
tion in the sample group from Portugal. On 
the Lisbon Stock Exchange (now Euronext 
Lisbon, which is part of  the NYSE Euronext 
Group), the opportunity to have more trans-
actions on the Euronext equity trading mar-
ket is greater than the transactions conducted 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This is 
due to the involvement of  the Lisbon Stock 
Exchange with the NYSE Euronext group, 
which allows publicly listed companies on 
Euronext Lisbon to access global and diver-
sified investors worldwide. Therefore, the 
disclosure of  voluntary non-financial infor-
mation to the public is expected to be value 
relevant, where the presence of  CSR-related 
information may help buyers, sellers, and 
brokers to lower the cost of  searching for 
information on the best price. Thus, brokers 
may offer a more attractive price by offering 
a narrow bid-ask spread and lower fees (Fou-
cault, Pagano, and Roell, 2013).  
Robustness Test
 A robustness test was conducted 
as an additional analysis to see whether the 
obtained main empirical output indicates ro-
bust results. In the robustness test, we used 
the lagged independent variables to see if  
CSR practices and ESG performance are as-
sociated with asymmetric information. The 
purpose of  using the time-lag variable is to 
precisely obtain the most efficient estima-
tion output. As pointed out by Imbens and 
Wooldridge, (2009) we believed that a lagged 
variable occurred in the past (t-1) which could 
not be correlated with the error term ( ) in 
the current time (t0). The independent lagged 
variables are thus exogenous and are deemed 
to be relevant and convenient factors for ex-
plaining the variation of  the contemporane-
ous (t0) dependent variable. In this respect, we 
consider that the contemporaneous variable 
of  asymmetric information (t0) is supposed-
ly influenced by the previous information of  
time-variant variables in the proposed empir-
ical model. The output of  the robustness test 
using one-year time-lagged variables is avail-
able as follows.
As seen in Table 6, we tested the robust-
ness of  our main results by presenting the 
robustness check’s output. We used one-year 
time lag variables and regressed them on the 
variation of  the contemporaneous variable of  
Spread. As our notion in the a priori hypoth-
eses, we conjectured that CSR practices and 
ESG performance are negatively associated 
with asymmetric information (Spread). The 
obtained outputs indicated that either CSR 
practices or ESG performance showed a neg-
ative association with asymmetric informa-
tion (Spread), even though the obtained ro-
bustness test results were slightly better (i.e., 
in terms of  the coefficient signs consistency 
and the number of  significant variables) than 
the output in the main analysis. In a more de-
tailed analysis, CSR_repi,t-1 and CSR_assi,t-1 are 
reported to be negatively and statistically (p < 
0.05) associated with asymmetric information 
(Spread). Regarding the other proxies of  CSR 
practices, it can be seen that the coefficient 
sign of  CSR_comi,t-1 indicates a negative sign, 
while GRIi,t-1 shows positive coefficient beta 
but it is statistically insignificant (p < 0.05). 
Additionally, the direct test of  the ESG per-
formance variables (ENVscri,t-1, SOCscri,t-1, 
and GOVscri,t-1) shows a negative association 
with asymmetric information and statistical 
insignificance (p > 0.1). 
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Table 6. Additional panel data analysis (robustness check)
Spread 1CSR rep 2CSR com 3CSR ass 4GRI 5ENVscr 6SOCscr
7GOVscr Controls Year Industry .
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
= + + + + + + +
+ + +




VARIABLES Expected sign (1) Spread
CSR_repi,t-1 - -0.0165
[-2.1153]**
CSR_com i,t-1 - -0.0048
[-0.6666]
CSR_ass i,t-1 - -0.0203
[-2.4756]**
GRI i,t-1 - 0.0114
[1.5833]
ENVscr i,t-1 - -0.0005
[-2.000]
SOCscr I,t-1 - -0.0000548
[-0.274]
GOVscr i,t-1 - -0.0003
[-1.000]
SIZE i,t-1 +/- -0.0047
[-0.6025]
LEV i,t-1 +/- 0.00000209
[0.6040]
ROA i,t-1 +/- 0.0003
[1.000]









Notes: t statistics are available in the brackets. Each asterisk indicates statistical significance where; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
and * p<0.1 respectively using a two-tail test. This Table reports the results of  panel data analysis estimation using equation 1. 
The dependent variable is the asymmetric information (Spread) at the contemporaneous time, and the Independent variable is 
CSR practice (i.e., CSR_rep, CSR_com, CSR_ass, and GRI) and ESG performance (i.e., ENVscr, SOCscr, and GOVscr) at the 
one-year time lag. In the robustness test, we deliberately carried out the panel data regression using the pooled sample data. All 
the specifications in the model are estimated using OLS regression by including the year fixed-effect, industry fixed-effect and 
robust standard errors that have been clustered at the year and company levels.
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 The robustness test output provid-
ed a slightly different result compared with 
the main hypothesis testing. We argue that 
the use of  previous time-variant variables of  
CSR practices indicates a more robust effect 
in the change of  asymmetric information 
(Spreadi,t-1), in which the bid-ask spread is 
more likely to be reduced when the informa-
tion, with respect to the CSR-related informa-
tion and ESG performance, is fully absorbed 
by the market participants.This denotes that 
in order to be appropriately absorbed by the 
market, a non-financial information disclo-
sure needs some time lag. Thus, as pointed 
out by Botosan and Harris, (2000) and Us-
man and Yennita, (2018) companies should 
be able to immediately disseminate their 
CSR-related activities to the public after they 
have done them. A regular publication on 
environmental, social, and governance-relat-
ed activities could also be endorsed through 
their corporate social media platforms (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Youtube, 
Linkedin, and so forth). At the end of  the 
year, the CSR team may gather all the CSR 
and ESG related actions during the year in 
a compilation report (e.g., in the stand-alone 
report or as a dedicated page in the annual 
report). With this action, the stakeholders 
may have better understanding about com-
panies’ CSR engagements, and use this type 
of  publicly available information to lower the 
potential asymmetric information among the 
market’s participants.
Conclusion
 This study examines the association 
between CSR practices, ESG performance, 
and asymmetric information. Using a sample 
from two countries with 185-panel data ob-
servations in total, we find that neither CSR 
practices nor ESG performance are strongly 
associated with asymmetric information. In 
this regard, the hypotheses testing indicates 
that only GRI, as one of  the proxies of  CSR 
practices, is significantly associated with asym-
metric information (Spread). Meanwhile, out 
of  three surrogate indicators of  ESG per-
formance, only SOCscr is statistically associ-
ated with asymmetric information (Spread). 
Based on the obtained empirical evidence, we 
infer that the information about CSR report-
ing practices and ESG performance scores 
needs some time lag to be fully absorbed by 
the market’s participants and to be reflected 
in the bid-ask price changes. Even though the 
main test was performed using contempora-
neous data (t0), the results show that there is 
a weak relationship between CSR practices, 
ESG performance, and asymmetric informa-
tion. We also confirm the importance of  a 
time lag through the additional analysis, in 
which the association between each lagged 
independent variable of  interest (t-1) (CSR 
practices and ESG performance) shows a 
stronger relationship with the contempora-
neous(t0) asymmetric information.
 Finally, our study contributes to the 
literature in three ways. First, by providing a 
comparative study using the data from two 
different settings for the study and institu-
tional backgrounds. Second, the comparison 
study might facilitate us to further identify 
and investigate the potential relationship that 
could occur between the concept of  CSR 
practices, ESG performance, and asymmetric 
information in each country. Thus, by analyz-
ing this relation grounded on legitimacy and 
the signaling theory, it may enable us to de-
velop more testable hypotheses with respect 
to such a relation. Third, our systematic lit-
erature review indicates that there is no pri-
or study focused on combining the concept 
of  CSR practices, ESG performance, and 
asymmetric information in the same research 
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model. Hence, our findings could enhance 
the existing literature by providing empirical 
evidence on the nexus between CSR practic-
es, ESG performance, and asymmetric infor-
mation studies.
Limitation
 The more obvious limitation of  our 
study relates to the inability to control for the 
self-selection sample bias. Given that, in the 
sample selection procedure, we only focused 
on using the companies that had, at least 
once, published their non-financial informa-
tion (CSR, sustainability report, environmen-
tal report, etc) for the public. On top of  that, 
we only collected data from those companies 
covered by Thomson Reuters EIKON and 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 databases. Thus, 
we lost many observations since not all the 
companies that have published their non-fi-
nancial information are indexed in Thomson 
Reuters databases. Given this situation, our 
estimation could have incurred a potential 
endogeneity problem, which is problematic 
in accounting and finance research (Lennox 
et al., 2012; Tucker, 2010). In addition to this, 
we acknowledge that we do not clearly indi-
cate and investigate the causal-effect mech-
anism by initiating an observational study. 
Thus, future research may decide to adopt 
propensity score matching (PSM) to deal 
with the causal-effect mechanism regarding 
the number of  companies that can be classi-
fied as CSR adopters and non-adopters.
References
Amran, A., Lee, S. P., and Devi, S. S. (2014). The influence of  governance structure and strategic 
corporate social responsibility toward sustainability reporting quality. Business Strategy and 
the Environment, 23(4), 217–235. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1767
Bagnoli, M., and Watts, S. G. (2017). Voluntary assurance of  voluntary CSR disclosure. Journal of  
Economics and Management Strategy, 26(1), 205–230. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12171
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric analysis of  panel data. Econometric Theory, 13(05), 351. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0266466600006150
Bebbington, J., Larrinaga, C., and Moneva, J. M. (2008). Corporate social reporting and rep-
utation risk management. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 21(3), 337–361. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570810863932
Benlemlih, M., Shaukat, A., Qiu, Y., and Trojanowski, G. (2016). Environmental and social disclo-
sures and firm risk. Journal of  Business Ethics, 152(3), 613–626. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-016-3285-5
Birkey, R. N., Michelon, G., Patten, D. M., and Sankara, J. (2016). Does assurance on CSR re-
porting enhance environmental reputation? an examination in the U.S. context. Accounting 
Forum, 40(3), 143–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.07.001
Botosan, C. A., and Harris, M. S. (2000). Motivations for a change in disclosure frequency and 
its consequences: An examination of  voluntary quarterly segment disclosures. Journal of  
Accounting Research, 38(2), 329. https://doi.org/10.2307/2672936
Briem, C. R., and Wald, A. (2018). Implementing third-party assurance in integrated reporting: 
Companies’ motivation and auditors’ role. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
31(5), 1461–1485. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-03-2016-2447
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
174
Brooks, C., and Oikonomou, I. (2018). The effects of  environmental, social and governance 
disclosures and performance on firm value: A review of  the literature in accounting and 
finance. British Accounting Review, 50(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2017.11.005
Brown, H. S., de Jong, M., and Levy, D. L. (2009). Building institutions based on information 
disclosure: Lessons from GRI’s sustainability reporting. Journal of  Cleaner Production, 17(6), 
571–580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2008.12.009
Cho, C. H., Michelon, G., Patten, D. M., and Roberts, R. W. (2014). CSR report assurance in the 
USA: An empirical investigation of  determinants and effects. Sustainability Accounting, Man-
agement and Policy Journal, 5(2), 130–148. https://doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-01-2014-0003
Cho, S. Y., Lee, C., and Pfeiffer, R. J. (2013). Corporate social responsibility performance and 
information asymmetry. Journal of  Accounting and Public Policy, 32(1), 71–83. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.005
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., and Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theo-
ry: A review and assessment. Journal of  Management, 37(1), 39–67. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0149206310388419
Cormier, D., and Magnan, M. (2015). The economic relevance of  environmental disclosure and 
its impact on corporate legitimacy: An empirical investigation. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 24(6), 431–450. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1829
Deegan, C., Cooper, B. J., and Shelly, M. (2006). An investigation of  TBL report assurance state-
ments: Australian evidence. Australian Accounting Review, 16(2), 2–18. https://doi.org/
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1835-2561.2006.tb00355.x
Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., and Yang, Y. G. (2012). Nonfinancial disclosure 
and analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 723–759. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10218
Ding, R., and Hou, W. (2015). Retail investor attention and stock liquidity. Journal of  Interna-
tional Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 37, 12–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.int-
fin.2015.04.001
E and Y. (2017). Is your nonfinancial performance revealing the true value of  your business to 
investors? In Ernst and Young.
European Commission. (2014). Directive 2014/95/EU of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council of  22 October 2014. Official Journal of  the European Union. https://doi.org/
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_285/l_28520031101en00330037.pdf
Famiola, M., and Adiwoso, S. A. (2016). Corporate social responsibility diffusion by multination-
al subsidiaries in Indonesia: organisational dynamic and institutional effect. Social Respon-
sibility Journal, 12(1), 117–129. https://doi.org/10.1108/SRJ-10-2013-0128
Foucault, T., Pagano, M., and Roell, A. (2013). Market Liquidity: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 
In O. USA (Ed.), Disputatio. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof
Fuhrmann, S., Ott, C., Looks, E., and Guenther, T. W. (2017). The contents of  assurance state-
ments for sustainability reports and information asymmetry. Accounting and Business Re-
search, 47(4), 369–400. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2016.1263550
GRI. (2014). G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines - Reporting Principles and Standard Dis-




Hąbek, P., and Wolniak, R. (2016). Assessing the quality of  corporate social responsibility re-
ports: the case of  reporting practices in selected European Union member states. Quality 
and Quantity, 50, 399–420. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0155-z
Hahn, R., and Lulfs, R. (2014). Legitimizing negative aspects in GRI-oriented sustainability re-
porting: A qualitative analysis of  corporate disclosure strategies. Journal of  Business Ethics, 
123(3), 401–420. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1801-4
Hendarto, K. A. (2009). The Implementation of  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Central 
Java Earthquake: A Preliminary Study on Consumer Belief, Attitude, and Purchase Inten-
tion. Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business, 11(3), 409. https://doi.org/10.22146/
gamaijb.5522
Hodge, K., Subramaniam, N., and Stewart, J. (2009). Assurance of  sustainability reports: Impact 
on report users’ confidence and perceptions of  information credibility. Australian Ac-
counting Review, 19(3), 178–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1835-2561.2009.00056.x
Imbens, G. W., and Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics of  
program evaluation. Journal of  Economic Literature, 47(1), 5–86. https://doi.org/10.1257/
jel.47.1.5
Junior, R. M., and Best, P. (2017). GRI G4 content index: Does it improve credibility and change 
the expectation – performance gap of  GRI-assured sustainability reports ? Sustainabil-
ity Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 8(5), 571–594. https://doi.org/10.1108/
SAMPJ-12-2015-0115
Khan, M., Serafeim, G., and Yoon, A. (2016). Corporate sustainability: First evidence on materi-
ality. The Accounting Review, 91(6), 1697–1724. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2308/
accr-51383
KPMG. (2017). The KPMG survey of  corporate responsibility reporting 2017. In KPMG. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nnano.2013.238
KPMG International. (2015). KPMG survey of  corporate responsibility reporting 2015. In 
KPMG Corporate Responsibility Reporting. https://doi.org/www.kpmg.com/sustainability
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and cor-
porate governance. Journal of  Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0304-405X(00)00065-9
Lang, M. H., and Lundholm, R. J. (2000). Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: reducing 
information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary Accounting Research, 17(4), 623–
662. https://doi.org/10.1506/9N45-F0JX-AXVW-LBWJ
Lennox, C. S., Francis, J. R., and Wang, Z. (2012). Selection models in accounting research. The 
Accounting Review, 87(2), 589–616. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10195
Leuz, C., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of  increased disclosure. 
Journal of  Accounting Research, 38(1), 91–124. https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v32.n1.1001
Lys, T., Naughton, J. P., and Wang, C. (2015). Signaling through corporate accountability re-
porting. Journal of  Accounting and Economics, 60(1), 56–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jac-
ceco.2015.03.001
Mahoney, L. S., Thorne, L., Cecil, L., and LaGore, W. (2013). A research note on standalone 
corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing? Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 24(4–5), 350–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2012.09.008
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
176
Manurung, A. M., and Basuki, H. (2010). An analytical assessment of  assurance practices in so-
cial environmental and sustainable reporting in the United Kingdom and North America. 
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business, 12(1), 75–115.
Mercer, M. (2004). How do investors assess the credibility of  management disclosures? Account-
ing Horizons, 18(3), 185–196. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2004.18.3.185
Michelon, G., and Parbonetti, A. (2012). The effect of  corporate governance on sustainability 
disclosure. Journal of  Management and Governance, 16(3), 477–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10997-010-9160-3
Michelon, G., Pilonato, S., and Ricceri, F. (2015). CSR reporting practices and the quality of  
disclosure: An empirical analysis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 33, 59–78. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cpa.2014.10.003
Michelon, G., Pilonato, S., Ricceri, F., and Roberts, R. W. (2016). Behind camouflaging: Tradi-
tional and innovative theoretical perspectives in social and environmental accounting 
research. Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 7(1), 2–25. https://doi.
org/10.1108/09574090910954864
Moneva, M., Archel, P., and Correa, C. (2006). GRI and the camouflaging of  corporate unsustain-
ability. Accounting Forum, 30(1), 121–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2006.02.001
Moroney, R., Windsor, C., and Aw, Y. T. (2011). Evidence of  assurance enhancing the quali-
ty of  voluntary environmental disclosures: An empirical analysis. Accounting and Finance, 
52(March 2011), 903–939. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00413.x
Muller, A., and Kolk, A. (2009). CSR Performance in emerging markets evidence from mexico. 
Journal of  Business Ethics, 85(SUPPL. 2), 325–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-
9735-y
Neu, D., Warsame, H., and Pedwell, K. (1998). Managing public impressions: environmental 
disclosures in annual reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23(3), 265–282. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(97)00008-1
Nurazi, R., Santi, F., and Usman, B. (2015). Tunnelling: evidence from Indonesia stock exchange. 
Asian Academy of  Management Journal of  Accounting and Finance, 11(2), 127–150.
Nurazi, R., and Usman, B. (2019). Does search engine query data contribute to returns and li-
quidity? Serbian Journal of  Management, 14(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.5937/sjm14-14992
Nurazi, R., Usman, B., and Kananlua, P. S. (2016). Does bid/ask spread react to the increase of  
internet search traffic? International Research Journal of  Business Studies, 8(3), 181–196.
Patten, D. M., and Zhao, N. (2014). Standalone CSR reporting by U.S. retail companies. Account-
ing Forum, 38(2), 132–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.01.002
Pedhazur, E. J. (1997). Multiple regression in behavioral research. Retrieved from https://www.ama-
zon.com/J-Pedhazur-Multiple-Regression-Behavioral/dp/B008VR4WMG
Pérez, A. (2015). Corporate reputation and CSR reporting to stakeholders. Corporate Communica-
tions: An International Journal, 20(1), 11–29. https://doi.org/10.1108/CCIJ-01-2014-0003
Peters, G. F., and Romi, A. M. (2015). The association between sustainability governance char-
acteristics and the assurance of  corporate sustainability reports. Auditing: A Journal of  
Practice and Theory, 34(1), 163–198. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-50849
Pope, S., and Wæraas, A. (2016). CSR-washing is rare: A conceptual framework, literature review, 




Romero, S., Fernandez-Feijoo, B., and Ruiz, S. (2014). Perceptions of  quality of  assurance state-
ments for sustainability reports. Social Responsibility Journal, 10(3), 480–499. https://doi.
org/10.1108/SRJ-10-2012-0130
Rutherford, B. A. (2003). Obfuscation, textual complexity and the role of  regulated narrative 
accounting disclosure in corporate governance. Journal of  Management and Governance, 7(2), 
187–210. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023647615279
Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A., and Chua, W. F. (2009). Assurance on sustainability reports: An in-
ternational comparison. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 937–967. https://doi.org/10.2308/
accr.2009.84.3.937
Steinmeier, M., and Stich, M. (2017). Does sustainability assurance improve managerial invest-
ment decisions ? European Accounting Review, (December), 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09638180.2017.1412337
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the change in the paradigm in economics information. The 
American Economic Review, 92(3), 460–501. https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260136363
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy 
of  Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080331
Tucker, J. W. (2010). Selection bias and econometric remedies in accounting and finance research. 
Journal of  Accounting Literature, 29(1), 31–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bmc.2009.11.051
Usman, B. (2019). Ownership structures, control mechanism and related party transaction: An 
empirical study of  the Indonesian public listed companies. International Journal of  Econom-
ics and Management, 13(1), 1–20.
Usman, B. (2020a). CSR performance, firm’s attributes, and sustainability reporting. International 
Journal of  Business and Society, 21(2), 521–539.
Usman, B. (2020b). CSR reports, CSR disclosure quality, and corporate reputations: A systematic 
literature review. Indonesian Journal of  Sustainability Accounting and Management, 4(1). https://
doi.org/10.28992/IJSAM.V4I1.166
Usman, B., and Tandelilin, E. (2014). Internet search traffic and its influence on liquidity and re-
turns of  Indonesian stocks: An empirical study. Journal of  Indonesian Economy and Business, 
29(3), 203–221.
Usman, B., and Yennita, Y. (2018). CSR Practice and asymmetry information of  Indonesian pub-
lic listed companies. International Research Journal of  Business Studies, 11(1), 45–66. https://
doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21632/irjbs
Waagstein, P. R. (2011). The mandatory corporate social responsibility in Indonesia: Problems 
and implications. Journal of  Business Ethics, 98(3), 455–466. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-010-0587-x
Yoon, B., Lee, J. H., and Ryan, B. (2018). Does ESG performance enhance firm value? Evidence 
from Korea. Sustainability, 10, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103635
